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NOTES
TESTAMENTARY REVOCATION BY ADOPTIOtN OF A
CHILD
Children, as commonly considered under statutes providing
for revocation of wills in certain instances, fall into three classes:
(a) pretermitted (those born at the time but unmentioned in
the will) ; (b) those born after the execution of the will and un-
provided for; and (c) posthumous children. Are adopted
children to be classed with these ?
In dealing with the problem of adoption there are naturally
both the adoption statutes and the testamentary revocation stat-
utes to be considered. The typical statute on adoption declares
the adopted child shall have all the rights and privileges of a
natural born child.' Some enter into greater detail than others,
but the apparent intent was generally to place the adopted child
on a par with a natural born child, at least so far as concerns
the proprietary rights and privileges of the adopters and the
adopted as well as other rights and privileges growing out of
the domestic relation.
If the wills statute provides for revocation either entire or
pro tanto by the subsequent birth of children, does that statute
apply to adopted children who have been pretermitted or
adopted after the execution of the will? There are two conflict-
ing lines of opinion in the matter. One group of decisions de-
clares that the wills statute must be construed strictly as apply-
ing only to natural born children, emphasizing the word "birth"
found in the statute or the word "issue".2 The court will not
interpolate "or the adoption of a child" into the statute.3
1Under such statutes as that of Alabama, which simply make an
adopted child capable of inheriting, an adopted child, unmentioned in
the will, would not be entitled to the rights of a natural born child.
See Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900 (1888); Carroll's Kentucky
Statutes (1930), see. 2071.
2 Commassi's Estate, 107 Cal. 1, 40 P. 15 (1895); Davis v. Fogle,
124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E. 860 (1890); Suc. of McRacken, 162 La. 443, 110
So. 645 (1927); Evans v. Evans, 186 S. W. 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).3 Davis v. Fogle, supra, n. 2. On the other hand, in Indiana, where
the problem of revocation is not involved, an adopted child may be
considered a child of the deceased, see Bray v. Miles, infra, n. 16.
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There is another line of authority, however, in which the
courts find it necessary to give full effect to the adoption statute.
The statute declares its purpose is to place the adopted child in
the exact position in all respects with a natural born, child, save
that it recognizes that the legislature cannot create the fact of
birth. Thus, if the adopted child has all the rights of a natural
child, he has the right to have the will, which fails to mention
him, disregarded so far as he is concerned and revoked pro
tanto.4 Under such a construction the fact that the adopted child
lost its foster parents by death and was readopted by others does
not prevent a revocation of the will of the first adoptive parent
because of the later adoption. 5 The law creates a capacity in
the adopted child which is the exact equivalent of a natural born
child. So subsequent marriage and adoption of a child is suffi-
cient as a substitute for the common law rule of marriage and
birth, to revoke the entire will. 6 If, however, provision has been
made in the will for the child before it was adopted, there is no
revocation,7 which rule again corresponds to the rule applicable
to the birth of a child.
A good many statutes provide for pro tanto revocation only,
i. e., that an omitted child shall take such share as he would
have taken if the parent had died intestate.8 Others, again, de-
clare that there is a revocation of the entire will in such a case,
but the former alternative seems a far more appropriate pro-
vision.9
IIn re Hebb's Estate, 134 Wash. 424, 235 P. 974 (1925); In re Roder-
cic's Estate, 291 Pac. 325 (Wash. 1930).
rDreyer v. Schricf, 105 Kan. 495, 185 P. 30 (1919). See 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 724 (1920). But see Re Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 164
N. W. 381 (1917), contra.
Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605, 87 N. W. 853 (1901).
'Bowdlear v. Bowdlear, 112 Mass. 184 (1873).
"Flanigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 396, 65 N. E. 782 (1902); Dreyer
v. Dreyer, supra, n. 5; Rendell's Estate, 244 Mich. 194, 221 N. W. 116,
27 Mich. L. Rev. 357 (1928); Remmers v. Remmers, 239 S. W.
509 (Mo. 1922); Bourne v. Dorney, 171 N. Y. S. 264 (App. D. 191).
So where the foster parent has agreed not to disinherit the child, an
attempted disinheritance by will has no effect and the child will take
as If testator had left no child, In re Schmidt's Will, 273 P. 21 (Col.
1928).
9 Hilpire v. Claude, 109 Ia. 159, 80 N. W. 332, 77 A. S. R. 524
(1899); Surman v. Surman, 21 Ohio App. 434, 153 N. E. 873 (1916). In
Pennsylvania, which 'disfavors the adopted child, the former statute
provided for pro tanto revocation as to a pretermitted child, while the
statute of 1920 causes an entire revocation. Goldstein v. Hammell, 236
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The position taken in New York may be the subject of de-
bate. It was held some years ago in the surrogate court that an
adopted child was indeed in the same position as a natural born
child but that neither, on being omitted from the will, could
claim a revocation under the statute.10 In a later ase, after a
change in the statute, the Appellate Division held the revoca-
tion applied as well to adopted children as to natural born
children and that the former will was pro tanto revoked by the
adoption of a child.'1 In a subsequent case in the surrogate
court it was held that the adoption of a child by a sister of testa-
trix, who was a legatee, did not prevent the lapse of the legacy
when the sister predeceased the testatrix, leaving such adopted
child living. Thus, in Re Mai-tin's Will,12 the statute provided
that if a beneficiary under a will shall predecease testator, there
shall be no lapse, if such beneficiary should leave issue surviving
the testator. Testatrix made a gift to her sister, who prede-
ceased testatrix, leaving a surviving adopted child. It was held
that a lapse was not avoided. While the problem is more or
less analogous to the problem of revocation considered above,
the decision does not necessarily determine the other issue. The
anti-lapse statute is not on all fours with a revocation statute.
This case, however, is opposed to the decision of an earlier
surrogate case.'
3
If the child were adopted before the execution of the will
occurred, in the states last mentioned above, he is like any other
pretermitted heir and the will is either revoked pro tanto or en-
tirely.
14
Pa. 305, 84 A. 772 (1912); In re Boyd's Estate, 270 Pa. 504, 113 A. 691
(1921).
"0 Gregory's Estate, 37 N. Y. S. 925 (Sur. 1896).
Bowne v. Dorney, supra, n. 8.
2230 N. Y. S. 7,34, 38 Yale L. Jour. 551 (Sur. 1928). No lapse i.
Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 A. 948 (1892).
"Foster's Estate, 177 N. Y. S. 827 (Sur. 1919). See 39 Yale L
Sour. 551 (1928); 2 Page on Wills Sec. 1252 (1926). There Is no lapse
in Kentucky if the beneficiary predeceases the testator, leaving an
adopted child.-Powcr v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671, 4 S. W. 683 (1887). Cf.
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (1930), secs. 2071, 4841.
u Thomas v. MaZoney, 142 Mo. App. 193, 126 S. W. 522 (1910)
(What amounted to specific performance of a promise to adopt was
enforced in order that the promisee might take as a pretermitted
child); Remmers v. Remmers, supra, n. 8 (pretermitted adopted child
held to be the equivalent of "issue" and the rule that there Is a pro
tanto revocation is one of law and not of intent); In re Book's Wi14
90 N. J. Eq. 549, 107 A. 435 (1919). (An unusual statute, 4 Comp. Stat.
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Assume that by statute the failure of a parent to make
mention of the issue of a deceased child in his will causes a
pro tanto revocation of the will of the grandparents as to such
issue. It seems correct to say that if the only child of such
deceased child is one he has adopted, there would be the same
result as if such child were the issue of the deceased child.
15
So where the will divides the estate between the children equally
and provides that in ease of the death of any one or more of
them, the share of those dying shall pass to their children, an
adopted child should take the share of one who predeceased the
testator.16 Where a statute declares, in effect, that if a spouse
dies without leaving issue and intestate and such decedent has
received any property .... by descent from the spouse who
predeceased such decedent, such property shall go back to the
brothers and sisters of the predeceased spouse; the adoption of
a child prevents the property thus received from going back.
The adopted child has therefore the capacity of "issue". 17 So
where 0 makes a voluntary conveyance of personalty in trust
for the use of his children and in case he should die without
issue then over, the child adopted thereafter prevents the gift
over from taking effect and is equivalent to "issue". s
On the whole, where the statute purports to create in an
adopted child the same capacity with reference to its adoptive
parent that a natural child has to its parent, it may be said that
a majority of the courts give effect to such intention and refuse
by strict construction of the revocation statute, to repudiate the
express terms of the adoption statute. Other courts have felt
impressed with the argument that revocation by such a circum-
stance, being outside the express letter of the revocation statute,
could not be thus accomplished. But cases where the adoption
(1910), N. J., p. 5865, declares, in effect, that if testator makes a will
having at the time no living issue and does not provide for prospective
issue or mention such prospective issue, then if he later dies leaving
issue or a wife enceinte, the will shall be void. Held, will not re-
voked because at time it was executed he had an adopted child.) See
also cases mentioned in n. 4, supra.
In re Hebb's Estate, supra, n. 4.
1 Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N. E. 446, 55 N. E. 510 (1899).
(But see the rule laid down in Martin's Will, supra, n. 12, where the
adoption of a child did not prevent the lapsing of a legacy).
1Miller v. Shepard, 29 Ohio AT)p. 22, 162 N. E. 788 (1928). See
Page's Complete Code of Ohio (1932), sec. 8577.
1Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262 (1874).
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statute is not so all inclusive, simply giving, for example, inherit-
able capacity, should not be used as arguments against revoca-
tion where the more inclusive statute is involved.
LEGITIMATION
The effect of the acknowledgment and legitimation of
illegitimate children is in general similar in principle to that of
adoption and in those states where the adoption statute does not
confer upon adopted children the capacity of natural born
children, probably legitimation also does not. One case has been
found where the question of revocation has been directly raised
by legitimation, and the holding was against revocation.1 9 On
the other hand, where full effect, including right to have par-
ent's will revoked, is given to the adoption statute similar effect
is probably given to legitimation. 20 In a number of cases we
may draw inferences regarding revocation where the problem of
conflict of laws arises. Thus, for example, in England legitima-
tion elsewhere did not create capacity to inherit land at com-
mon law or rather under the statute of Merton,2u and that rule
has been followed in some American states. 2 2 This is probably
no longer the law there.
2 3
"'Davis v. King, 89 N. C. 441 (1883); Padelford's Estate, 190 Pa.
St. 35, 42 A. 381 (1901) (A child born after wife's adultery and 1e
pudiated by testator in his will, was acknowledged by him in a com-
promise agreement, in which he was to provide for its support. Such
acknowledgment did not revoke the will, which was republished after
the acknowledgment. It may be observed, however, that the will ex-
pressly mentioned and repudiated her).
"' Caballero's Suc. v. Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573 (1872) (T lived in
concubinage with a woman of color in a state which forbade inter-
marriage. He removed from there to Spain and the two intermarried
there and their children, being legitimated, became forced heirs of
the testator, whose will had been executed prior to the legitimation).
2 1 Doe v. Vardill, 5 B. & C. 438, 108 Rep. 163 (K. B. 1826,). SeM
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, pp. 316-332 (1927).
2 2 Brown v. Finley, 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577 (1908) (Child adopted
in Louisiana, where parents were domiciled, not an heir to land In
Alabama). See also Lingen v. Lingen, 45 Ala. 410 '(1871) (Father and
mother domiciled in Alabama when child was begotten, went to France
where child was born and was acknowledged by the father there and
legitimated, but parents never intermarried. It does not clearly ap-
pear whether either of the parents were domiciled in France at time
of legitimation. Held, foreign legitimation ineffective in Alabama, unless
law of Alabama is complied with which requires intermarriage of the
parents also and relies on English rule); see also Hood v. McGhee, 237
U. S. 611 (1915) (Full faith and credit clause does not require Ala-
bama to recognize as heir of land a child adopted by parents domiciled
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A number of states hold that the status of an adopted or
legitimated child created under foreign laws will be given full
effect under the law of the forum. We may infer therefore
that revocation of a will would also be one of theconsequences
of such recognition where such child was pretermitted, or
adopted or legitimated after the will had been executed.
24
THm Roxr~w LAw
The adoption concept, as also thAt of legitimation, Was not
one eisting in the common law, but it cae Vo us by addptatiofr
from the Roman law ;2, and some brief co~iparisons of th6 'effect
of adoption, upon the revocation of wills in Rdman Law with
the'effect in our law -may be of interest.. .
in Georgia and there made an, heir), see Code of Alabama (1923),
see. 932 on adoption, sees. 9299-9301 on legitlmatloii, anadsec. 16685,
10584 and 10600 an revocation of will; Smith v, Kerrj 34 Pa. St. 12-&
(1859) (Niece legitimated in Tennessee claims as heir of unqle ;n
Pennsylvania. "The legitfihatioi' foigives the vice ot her birth in
Tennessee but not here"; see Statutes of Pennsylvania (1928)v5Sa-1 to
58a-4 on legitimation, sees. 1454%_ 14550 on revocation of wills, see.
8333; Williams 'v. Kimball, 35 lia. '49, 16'So.' 8' (1895).
IAdministration of Estates Act (1925), s:'4, sub, a. Ji, z.4'6,:sub;
s. 1, Legitimacy Act of 1926, 5 C, 60; 43 Law Q. Rev, 22 (1927), (Off-
spring of slave marriage legitimated in 'deorgih. "Statute ii6t''n
harmony with our system upon the capacity'of' persons to iherit 'reat
estate," confers no such power. Result may be accounted for on, dis-
similarity of statutes and stite poick). See'Compilea t .ws of Florida
(1927), sec. 5488, wluch gives inheritance capacity inc Florida to a
child adopted ii; another state; Barnum v. Barnum, 42,Md. 251, 307
(1875) (Statute 'of Arkansas, where parents were dbmnicil , 'legiti-
mated claimaiit. Act has no extra-territorial effect. This case dis-
tinguished on the facts and the declaration as to extra-territorial effect
overruled by Haflowan v. Safe Deposit Co., 151 Md. 321, 134 A. 4'7
(1926). The legitimation under the law of Nevada made such child
an heir in Maryland), Re Donald (1928), 4 D. L. R. 181 (Sask.) (Child
adopted in state of Washington before Adoption A6t 61f Saskatchewan
not an heir there), 1 , 11 . ,
2'Woodward's Appqal, .87 Conn. 152, 70 A. 453 (1908) (Adoption
in Wisconsin creates power to MneritY hwkv.Hawe, J37 'Ia. 24w,
114 N. W. 916 (N. Y adoption creates capacity to inherit), James v.
James, 35 Wash. 65, 77, 1082 (1904) (Aaoption in Iowa giveXi fult
effect), Caldwell's SuccesSion, 114 La. 195, 38 5q, t40 -(1960) Sd)
appendix for further list of authorities on this subject.
5 See the Law of Adoption by J. F Brosnan, 22 Col. L. Rev. T32
(1922).
f Some readily available authorities on Roman Law are as follows:
Buckland, "A Textbook of Roman Law" (1921), pp. 121-8; 1. Roby,
"Roman Private Law" (1902), pp. 59-62; Willis and Olliver on Roman
Law (1929), passim; Sandar's Justinian's Inst., p. 45; Inst. of Gaus,
bk. 2, See. 136; Davis v, Fogle, supra, n. 2; Sobmn's Institutes of Roman
Law (Translated by Ledlie, 3rd ed. (1907% -pp. 480-481, 501-578'
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In the first place, prior to Justinian the Roman law dis-
tinguished between the adoption of a stranger and the adoption
of a grandchild (child of an unemancipated son). In the former
case, the adoption created a suits heres and the will became void
(r'wptum), whereas the adopted grandchild was already a suus
heres and no such effect resulted. Since our concept of the
patria potestas radically differs, the two adoptions would gen-
erally be indistinguishable in effect.
The Roman law also distinguished between the adoption of
an infant and the adoption of one who is sui juris, whereas we
gbnerally do not.2 7 This grows out of the fundamental differ-
ence in the purpose of adoption between the two systems, which
it is not the present purpose to discuss. The former in Roman
law was called adoptio and the latter adrogatio. There was a
difference also in the procedure which emphasized the distinc-
tion between the two. The latter was one means by which uni-
versal suggestion might be accomplished.
A will in Roman law was revoked by the advent of a
postumus heres, unless he were expressly mentioned in the will
in advance and disinherited. Thus, a will might become void
(irritum) by the death of a suits heres, who left children who
thus would become sui heredes of the testator. At common law,
birth of children after the making of the will or after the death
of the testator or even the passing over of a child, leaving him
unmentioned in the will, did not revoke a will unless along
with such fact there was the additional fact of subsequent
marriage.
In Roman law a testator's own will was invalidated through
the adoption of himself by another because a person in manu
did not have testamentary power. Such a result would scarcely
occur in our law. In addition to the fact that such adoption is
Jolowiez, Historical Introduction to Roman Law (1932), 118-120; Fred
H. Blume, Legitimation under Roman Law, 5 Tulane L. Rev. 256-266
(1931); L. J. Samuel, Acknowledgment of Illegitimate Children, 6
Tulane L. Rev. 120-123 (1932).
But see First N~at. Bank v. Mott, 133 So. 78 (Fla. 1931) (Adult
married woman cannot be adopted by another so as to entitle adopted
person to inherit. Child means a minor. Here the adoption took place
under the law of Connecticut and Florida Statutes, Sec. 3624,
recognizes a foreign adoption). For variations In the requirements of
American statutes, such as that the adopter must be older than the
adopted person and similar requirements, see the Law of Adoption by
J. F. Brosnan, 22 Col. L. Rev. 332 (1922).
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not a statutory ground of revocation, there is usually statutory
provision regarding the age limit below which wills cannot be
validly executed by the testator.
Again, in classical Roman law the adopted person lost all
rights of inheritance from his blood relatives as he no longer
belonged to the familia of his blood father. This was changed
by the legislation of Justinian. Our statutes on adoption have
uniformly been construed to permit an adopted person to inherit
directly from his blood parents and also from his adoptive par-
ents, but they have not been construed generally to authorize
inheritance in the collateral lines.
,ALvn, EvAs
APPENDIX
ARTIcLES AND NoTS ON ADOPTION AND LEGITIMATION
6 Can. Bar Rev. 729 (1928), Wills-Standards of Interpretation,
Adopted Child, discusses Re Donald (1928), 4. D. L. R. 187 (Sask.).
Court feels bound by Burnfiel v. Burnfel, 20 Sask. L. R. 407 (1926), 2
D. L. R. 129, which holds that a child adopted in a state which gives
him the privileges of one born in lawful wedlock is not entitled to
be a distributee in another jurisdiction. Note points out this distinc-
tion: The right as a distributee depends upon the statute of the place
where the property is, but in the p. c. the language of the will, when
properly Interpreted, includes this child and should be a question of
construction of a will rather than the application of the statute; 45
Harv. L. Rev. 890-896 (1932), Effect of Statutes Altering the Position
of Illegitimate Children in the Judicial Construction of Wills; 9' Ill.
L. Rev. 149-174 (1914), Rights of Adopted Children, by A. M. Kales;
31 W. Va. L. Rev. 251 (1925), The Status of Legislation and Adop-
tion, by E. L. Dodril.; 22 Col. L. Rev. 332-342 (1922), The Law 'of
Adoption, by J. F. Brasnan (Discusses the Roman law origin of adop-
tion, the peculiarities of statutes in various states, and advocates a
uniform statute on adoption); 22 Mich. L. Rev. 63?, 651 (19 4), Good-
rich, Legitimation and Adoption in the Conflict of Laws; 14 Cal. L.
Rev. 420 (1926), Legitimation Through Acts, Acknowledgment, Who
are Parents of Legitimated Child?; 5 Can. Bar Rev. 186 (1927), The
Legitimation and Adoption Act; 34 Law Quart. Rev. 402-411 (1918),
The Passing of the Bastard Eigne, by Charles Sweet; 36 Law Quart.
Rev. 255-267 (1920), Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage, by J.
Dundas White; 43 Harv. L. Rev. .652 (1930), Adoption-Rights of
Child In Estate of One Who Made Invalid Contract to Adopt Him.
See also 25 Mich. L. Rev. 189, Conflict of Laws--Recognition of
Child Legitimated Under Law bf Another State; 1 So. Cal. L. Rev.
270-274 (1928), Conflict of Laws, Lex Fori Applied to Legitimize; 15
St. Louis L. Rev. 198 (1930), Inheritance-Effect of Legitimating
Statute (no Inheritance from ancestors beyond father and mother-
strict construction); 3 A. B. A. Jour. 135-145 (1917), The Right of the
Adopted Child in Intestate Succession, by A. R. Thompson; 83 Cent.
L. Jour. 3-10 (1916), Inheritance by Next of Kin of An Adopted Child
from Adoptive Parent, by N. C. Collier; 93 Cent. L. Jour. 3-13 (1921),
K. L. J.-10
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Inheritance by and Through Adopted Children, by W. W. Herron; 24
Mich. L. Rev. 850 (1926), Conflict of Laws, Jurisdiction to Legitimate;
6 Wash. L. Rev. 94-5 (1931), Roderick's Estate, 291 Pac. 325 (1930)-an
adopted child inherits from its natural parents though not mentioned
in will, pro tanto revocation; 35 Yale L. Jour. 890 (1926), Revocation
ofAdoption Power of. State to Cut Off Expectancy.
